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The existing literature on price asymmetries does not systematically investigate the 
sensitivity of the empirical results to the choice of a particular econometric 
specification. This paper fills this gap by providing a detailed comparison of the three 
most popular models designed to describe asymmetric price behaviour, namely 
asymmetric ECM, autoregressive threshold ECM and ECM with threshold 
cointegration. Each model is estimated on a common monthly dataset for the gasoline 
markets of France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK over the period 1985-2003. All 
models are able to capture the temporal delay in the reaction of retail prices to changes 
in spot gasoline and crude oil prices, as well as some evidence of asymmetric behaviour. 
However, the type of market and the number of countries which are characterized by 
asymmetric oil-gasoline price relations vary across models. The asymmetric ECM 
yields some evidence of asymmetry for all countries, mainly at the distribution stage. 
The threshold ECM strongly rejects the null hypothesis of symmetric price behaviour, 
particularly in the case of France and Germany. Finally, the ECM with threshold 
cointegration finds long-run asymmetry for each country in the reaction of retail prices 
to oil price changes. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The  transmission  of  positive  and  negative  changes  in  the  price  of  oil  to  the  price  of 
gasoline is very relevant for both consumers, who tend to be very sensitive to the money they 
pay for the fuel consumed by their cars, and researchers, who are often requested to provide 
plausible  explanations  of  the  observed  temporal  behaviour  of  the  oil-gasoline  price 
relationship. 
 
The notion that gasoline prices react quickly to oil price increases and slowly to oil price 
reductions is largely accepted among consumers. The levels recently hit by oil and gasoline 
prices  and  the  present  uncertainty  in  supply  and  reserve  availability  have  contributed  to 
reinvigorate the interest in the asymmetric transmission of changes in the price of oil to the 
price  of  gasoline.  According  to  the  latest  Oil  Market  Report  issued  by  the  International 
Energy Agency, oil prices strengthened for most of January 2005 and then slightly declined in 
early February 2005. During the same period, gasoline prices recorded a rally. On Friday, 4
th 
March 2005 Brent has been quoted 51.73 U.S. dollars per barrel in London, whereas in New 
York the price of WTI has reached 54 U.S. dollars. Moreover, the average price of the OPEC 
oil (which is based on seven different oil qualities) has hit the level of 48.36 U.S. dollars, 
while only on Wednesday, 2
nd March 2005 it was quoted 47.01 U.S. dollars. On the product 
side, the Italian gasoline price at the pump is close to 1.20 Euros per litre, while gasoil has 
been quoted Euros 1.09: both are the maximum levels recorded over the last three months.  
 
The  literature  looking  for  empirical  evidence  in  support  of  asymmetries  in  the 
transmission mechanism is wide. This literature employs a variety of reduced-form dynamic 
regression  models  relating  the  price  of  gasoline  to  the  price  of  oil.  Findings  vary  across 
countries, time periods, frequency of the data, markets and models, but in general they fail to 
provide strong evidence that prices rise faster than they fall.   
 
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  address  the  following  question:  to  what  extent  does  the 
empirical evidence on price asymmetries depend on the specific model used to analyze the 
relationship between gasoline and oil prices? This question is particularly relevant, since the   2 
existing literature does not systematically investigate the sensitivity of the empirical results to 
the choice of a particular econometric specification. Actually, one of the few attempts to 
explain  the  variability  of  the  empirical  findings  on  price  asymmetries  goes  back  to  Shin 
(1994), who nevertheless argues that the contradictory results are mainly due to the lack of 
homogeneity in the data, rather than to different models.  
 
The present paper fills this gap by providing a detailed comparison of the three most 
popular models designed to describe asymmetric price behaviour, namely asymmetric error 
correction  model (henceforth asymmetric ECM), autoregressive threshold ECM and ECM 
with threshold cointegration. In order to reduce the proportion of variability in the results due 
to different countries, periods of time, data frequencies and markets, each model is estimated 
on a common monthly dataset which describes the retail and wholesale gasoline markets of 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK over the period 1985-2003. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. An exhaustive review of the econometric literature on 
price asymmetries in the gasoline market is offered in Section 2. Section 3 describes the data 
and the econometric models used in the empirical analysis. The results are presented and 
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.   
 
2.  Overview of the literature 
 
Numerous attempts have been made to analyze the relationship between the price of crude oil 
and the price of gasoline (or other petroleum products). Studies typically differ in one or more 
of the following aspects: the country under scrutiny; the time frequency and period of the data 
used; the stage of the transmission mechanism, i.e. either retail or wholesale, or both; the 
dynamic model employed in the empirical investigation. 
 
The problem of a different response to price increases and decreases is first considered in 
Bacon (1991), where attention is paid to the U.K. gasoline market but limited to the second 
stage of the transmission chain (the ex-Rotterdam spot price is used as a proxy of the product 
price). Biweekly data are used for the period 1982-1989. The author finds that increases in the 
product price are full transmitted within two months, in the case of price reductions an extra 
week  is  necessary;  changes  in  the  exchange  rate  necessitate  two  extra  weeks  relative  to 
product prices before being incorporated in retail gas prices.   3 
  
Again the U.K. is the country studied by Manning (1991), who instead looks directly at the 
impact of changes in oil prices on retail prices. The data are monthly for 1973-1988 and an 
ECM specification allowing for asymmetry only in the dynamic part of the equation. It is 
found weak and non-persistent asymmetry in price changes, which is absorbed within four 
months. No formal tests of asymmetric price effects are however performed.  
 
Karrenbrock  (1991)  employs  1983-1990  monthly  data  to  study  the  empirical  relationship 
between  U.S. wholesale and (after tax) retail gasoline prices. Operationally, the author uses a 
distributed lags model to find that the length of time in which a wholesale price increase is 
fully reflected in the retail gasoline price is the same as that of a wholesale price decrease for 
premium and unleaded regular gasoline. Instead, wholesale price increase for leaded regular 
gasoline are passed along to consumer more quickly than price increases. Nevertheless, the 
author concludes, contrary to the popular belief that consumers do not benefit from wholesale 
gasoline  price  decreases,  these  are  eventually  passed  along  to  consumers  as  fully  as  are 
wholesale gasoline price increases. 
 
Kirchgässner and Kübler (1992) also look at Western Germany for the period 1972-1989 
using monthly data. The authors consider the response of both consumer and producer leaded 
gasoline prices to the spot price of the Rotterdam market; they do so for two sub-periods, 
before and after January 1980. The methodology adopted is very rigorous, as the variables are 
tested for, respectively, unit roots, Granger causality, cointegration, and structural breaks. 
When cointegration cannot be rejected, both symmetric and asymmetric ECMs are fitted. 
Unfortunately, the asymmetry is permitted only for price changes, thus allowing only for a 
different response in the short-run but not in the long-run. Briefly stated, the results show that, 
while long-run reactions are not significantly different for the 1970s and the 1980s, there is 
considerable asymmetry in the former period but not in the latter in the short-run adjustment 
processes. In particular, reductions in the Rotterdam prices are transferred faster to German 
markets than increases. 
 
Shin  (1994)  relates the  average  wholesale  price  of  oil  products  to  the  price  of  oil  in  his 
investigation of the U.S. market using monthly data for the period 1982-1990. His dynamic 
model shows no evidence of asymmetric effect.  
   4 
Again the U.S. attracts the interest of Duffy-Deno (1996), and in particular the downstream 
relationship between wholesale and net-of-tax-retail gasoline prices The data this time are 
weekly for 1989-1993 and the econometric model shows strong persistent asymmetries, with 
a complete adjustment in the case of price rises and incomplete for price falls.  
 
Borenstein et al. (1997) study the U.S. gasoline market using weekly data for 1986-1992. The 
empirical  investigation  confirms  the  common  belief  that  retail  gasoline  prices  react  more 
quickly to increases in crude oil prices than do decreases (4 weeks versus 8 weeks). An ECM 
is estimated but, like the previous paper, only asymmetry for price changes is permitted. The 
authors  offer  three  possible  interpretations  of  the  presence  of  asymmetric  gasoline  price 
behaviour. The first justifies downward gasoline price stickiness in terms of the existence of a 
natural  focal  point  for  oligopolistic  sellers  when  oil  prices  are  falling.  According  to  the 
second, production lags and inventories allow to a quicker accommodation of negative shocks 
to optimal future consumption than positive shocks. The third interpretation relates oil price 
volatility to the degree of competition in the retail market.  
 
Balke et al. (1998) extend the work of Borenstein at al. (1997) by using two different model 
specifications  with  weekly  data  from  1987  through  1997.  In  particular  the  authors  use  a 
distributed  lag  model  in  the  levels  of  prices  with  asymmetric  effects  and  an  ECM 
representation which allows for both long-run and short-run asymmetry. On the basis of an 
encompassing test this last specification is preferred. Both models involve three prices, with 
the wholesale price depending upon oil and spot prices and the retail price upon wholesale 
and spot prices. The author do not obtain unambiguous evidence concerning asymmetry, been 
weak in the specification in levels and moderate and persistent in the ECM. 
 
Reilly and Witt (1998) come back to the U.K. market to revisit the evidence of Bacon (1991) 
and Manning (1991) with monthly data for 1982-1995 and emphasizing the role of the dollar-
pound exchange rate and the potential asymmetries associated with it, in addition to those of 
crude oil prices. A restricted ECM is estimated which allows only for short-run asymmetry. 
The hypothesis of a symmetric response by petrol retailers to crude price rises and falls is 
rejected by the data, and so is for changes in the exchange rate. 
 
Akarca and Andrianacos (1998) investigate the dynamic relationship between crude oil and 
retail  gasoline  prices  during  the  last  21  years  and  show  that,  in  February  1986,  this   5 
relationship  had  drastically  changed.  Since  then,  the  results  suggest  that  gasoline  prices 
include higher profit margins, they are substantially less sensitive to changes in crude oil 
prices, and are more volatile. 
 
Brown  and  Yucel  (2000)  examine  the  market  conditions  underlying  the  asymmetric 
relationship  between  gasoline  and  crude  oil  prices.  They  find  the  observed  asymmetry  is 
unlikely to be the result of monopoly power. The remaining explanations for the asymmetry 
suggest that policies to prevent an asymmetric relationship between gasoline and crude oil 
prices are likely to reduce economic efficiency. 
 
Other papers look at the experience of other countries. For example, Godby et al. (2000) study 
the Canadian market for both premium and regular gasoline. The analysis is based on weekly 
data  for  thirteen  cities  between  1990  and  1996.  By  noting  that  the  asymmetric  ECM 
specifications used in previous studies are misspecified if price asymmetries are triggered by 
a minimum absolute increase in crude cost, a Treshold AutoRegressive model within an ECM 
is implemented in the paper. On this basis the authors fail to find evidence of asymmetric 
pricing behavior. 
    
Asplund et al. (2000) investigate the Swedish retail market by fitting a restricted ECM with 
asymmetries only on the short-run dynamic components. The data are monthly and cover the 
period 1980 through 1996. There is some evidence that in the short-run prices are stickier 
downwards than upwards. Also, prices respond more rapidly to exchange rate movements 
than to the spot market prices. 
 
Borenstein and Shepard (2002) propose a model with costly adjustment of production and 
costly inventories, which  implies that wholesale gasoline prices will respond with a lag to 
crude oil cost shocks. Unlike explanations that rely upon menu costs, imperfect information, 
or long-term buyer/seller relationships, this model predicts that futures prices for gasoline will 
adjust incompletely to crude oil price shocks that occur close to the expiration date of the 
futures contract. Examining wholesale price responses in 188 gasoline markets, they also find 
that firms with market power adjust prices more slowly than do competitive firms, which is 
consistent with the model. 
   6 
Weekly retail gasoline prices in Windsor, Ontario, from 1989 to 1994 are analyzed by Eckert 
(2002). Retail prices appear to respond faster to wholesale price increases than to decreases, 
but exhibit a cyclic pattern inconsistent with a common explanation of response asymmetry. 
The  author  reconciles  these  observations  through  a  model  of  price  cycles.  Prices  on  the 
downward portion of the cycle appear insensitive to costs, compared with price increases, 
supporting the theory that price decreases result from battles over market share. This pattern 
resembles  a  faster  response  to  cost  increases  than  to  decreases,  and  the  conclusion  that 
asymmetry indicates a role for competition policy may be inappropriate. 
 
Salas (2002) uses an ordered probit, a partial adjustment, and a vector ECM to characterize 
price adjustments in the Philippine retail gasoline market since its deregulation. He finds that 
pricing decisions of oil firms depend significantly on eight weeks of previous changes in 
crude cost. Moreover, the speed of adjustment of retail prices to their long-run equilibrium 
relation  with  crude  cost  has  been  following  an  accelerating  trend  but  is  vulnerable  to 
intervening factors. Lastly, the empirical evidence suggests that pump prices respond more 
quickly and fully to increases in crude cost rather than to decreases. 
 
Bachmeier  and  Griffin  (2003)  consider  daily  data  and  adopt  an  Engle-Granger  two  step 
approach. No evidence of asymmetry is found for the American wholesale gasoline market 
over the period 1985-1998. In contrast with Borenstein et al. (1997), who claim that gasoline 
prices rise quickly following an increase in the price of crude oil but fall slowly following a 
decrease, they estimate an ECM with daily spot gasoline and crude-oil price data over the 
period  1985-1998  and  find  no  evidence  of  asymmetry  in  wholesale  gasoline  prices.  The 
sources  of  the  difference  in  results  are  twofold.  First,  a  standard  Engle-Granger  two-step 
estimation procedure is used, whereas Borenstein et al. (1997) use a non-standard estimation 
methodology. Second, even with the same non-standard specification, the use of daily rather 
than weekly data yields little evidence of price asymmetry. 
 
Bettendorf  et al. (2003) analyse the retail price adjustments in the Dutch gasoline market. 
They estimate an asymmetric ECM on weekly price changes for the years 1996-2001. They 
construct five datasets, one for each working day. The conclusions on asymmetric pricing are 
shown to differ over these datasets, suggesting that the choice of the day for which the prices 
are observed matters more than commonly believed. In their view, the insufficient robustness   7 
of the outcomes might explain the mixed conclusions found in the literature. They also show 
that the effect of asymmetry on the Dutch consumer costs is negligible.  
 
The paper by Galeotti et al. (2003) re-examines the issue of asymmetries in the transmission 
of shocks to crude oil prices onto the retail price of gasoline. The distinguishing features are: 
(i) use of updated and comparable data to carry out an international comparison of gasoline 
markets; (ii) two-stage modeling of the transmission mechanism, in order to assess possible 
asymmetries at either the refinery stage, the distribution stage or both; (iii) use of asymmetric 
ECM  to  distinguish  between  short-run  and  long-run  asymmetries;  (iv)  explicit,  possibly 
asymmetric, role of the exchange rate; (v) bootstrapping of F-tests of asymmetries, in order to 
overcome the low-power problem of conventional testing procedures. In contrast to several 
previous findings, the results generally point to widespread differences in both adjustment 
speeds and short-run responses when input prices rise or fall. 
 
The classical menu-cost interpretation, according to which prices are sticky because price 
menu changes are costly, implies that the probability of a price change should depend on the 
past history of prices and fundamentals only through the gap between the current price and 
the frictionless price. Davis and Hamilton (2004) find that this prediction is broadly consistent 
with the behavior of nine Philadelphia gasoline wholesalers. Nevertheless, they reject the 
menu-cost model as a literal description of these firms’ behaviour, arguing instead that price 
stickiness arises from strategic considerations of how customers and competitors will react to 
price changes. 
 
The influence of oil price volatility on the degree of gasoline price asymmetry is studied by 
Radchenko (2004). The author measures oil price volatility and gasoline price asymmetry and 
examines the impulse response functions of gasoline price asymmetry to a shock in oil price 
volatility. His findings suggest a robust negative relationship between the two variables for 
the American retail market over the period march 1991 - February 2003. 
 
Finally, Kaufmann and Laskowski (2005) analyze monthly data on the American petroleum 
market for the period January 1986 – December 2002, and use an asymmetric ECM approach. 
Their results suggest that, when utilization rates and the level of stocks are included in the 
model, the asymmetry between the price of crude oil and motor gasoline vanishes. Using the 
same specification of the model, they find asymmetries in the home heating oil market.    8 
 
To summarize, the vast majority of the articles reported in this survey have studied markets of 
individual countries. The frequency of the data is typically either weekly or monthly, although 
sometimes biweekly data are also employed. In general the contributions surveyed consider 
the lower end of the market, the one in which the product is distributed and sold at the pump. 
The relevant prices involved are therefore some definition of the wholesale price and the retail 
price. The other prevailing type of analysis relates the price of crude oil to the pump price 
within  a  single,  unique  stage.  Finally,  the  most  recent  papers  almost  invariably  test  for 
asymmetric  price  effects  both  in  the  short-run  and  long-run  using  dynamic  econometric 
models which exploit the presence of cointegration between the relevant variables. 
 
3.  Data and econometric models 
 
In  this  paper  the  transmission  of  changes  in  upstream  prices  to  downstream  prices  is 
investigated at different stages of the process of price formation. We consider the price of 
crude oil (CR) together with the gasoline spot price (SP), the before-tax gasoline retail price 
(NR) and the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and individual national currencies (ER) 
for five European countries, namely France, Germany, Italy, Spain and U.K.
1 The sample 
period  ranges  from  January  1985  to  March  2003,  and  the  frequency  of  observations  is 
monthly. All prices are log-transformed and expressed in local currencies, with the exception 
of crude prices that are denominated in U.S. dollar per barrel. 
 
In particular, the selected crude oil price is the Crude Oil Import Cost (average unit value, 
c.i.f.), and as a proxy for the ex-refinery gasoline price we use the spot price f.o.b. Rotterdam 
for the NW Europe. Both prices are from the International Energy Agency. The retail price is 
obtained as an average of the prices of leaded gasoline and unleaded gasoline. The weight of 
the first product is equal to one until January 1990 (April 1992 for Spain) and progressively 
decreases  to  zero  in  November  2001  (March  1997  for  Germany).
2  The  price  of  leaded 
gasoline is from the International Energy Agency until June 2000 (March 1997 for Germany) 
and from DATASTREAM for the remaining part of the sample. The unleaded gasoline price 
                                                 
1 The exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the Euro is multiplied by the fixed parity for each country after 
January 1999.   
2 This assumption reflects the fact that unleaded gasoline, while virtually absent in the retail market at the 
beginning of the sample, has become increasingly important during the period spanned by our investigation, and 
it has been recently the only type of gasoline available at the pump in the countries under analysis.    9 
is  from  DATASTREAM.  The  exchanges  rates  series  are  obtained  from  the  International 
Monetary Found for the first portion of the sample and from DATASTREAM since January 
1999.   
 
The vast majority of the empirical studies which have been surveyed in Section 2 is based 
on  the  concept  of  cointegration  between  output  and  input  prices.  In  the  broad  class  of 
cointegration models, the most popular specifications for the analysis of price asymmetries 
are the asymmetric ECM, the threshold ECM, and the ECM with threshold cointegration. 
 
3.1 Asymmetric ECM 
 
If the variables are integrated of order one, or I(1), they may form a linear combination 
which  is  stationary,  or  I(0).  The  Engle-Granger  two-step  procedure  considers  first  the 
relationship among the variables j x ,  m j ,.., 1 = , in levels: 
 
1 1 2 2 .. t t m mt t x x x b b b e = + + + +   (1) 
 
The  augmented  Dickey-Fuller  (ADF)  statistic  can  be  used  to  ascertain  whether  the 
residuals,  ˆt e , are stationary.
3 If this is the case, the relevant series are said to be cointegrated. 
Equation (1) can be considered a steady-state relation among the variables and included in a 
ECM of the form: 
 




t t i t i i t i i mt i t
i i i
x x x x u ae l g d - - - -
= = =
D = + D + D + + D + ∑ ∑ ∑   (2) 
 
with D indicating the first difference operator, and  p  the lag-length.  
 
Granger  and  Lee  (1989)  extended    the  ECM  specification  to  the  case  of  asymmetric 
adjustments. In order to allow for asymmetries, cointegration residuals and first differences on 
the x’s can be decomposed into positive and negative values. Therefore, model (2) can be 
written as: 
                                                 
3 Relevant critical values are available in MacKinnon (1991).   10 
 
1 1 1 1 1 2 2




p p p p
t t t i t i i t i i t i i t i
i i i i
p p
i mt i i mt i t
i i
x x x x x
x x u
a e a e l l g g
d d
+ + - - + + - - + + - -
- - - - - -
= = = =
+ + - -
- -
= =
D = + + D + D + D + D +
+ + D + D +
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
  (3) 
 
The asymmetry in the adjustment speed is introduced by defining  ˆt e
+ equal to  ˆt e  if  ˆ 0 t e >  
and to zero if  ˆ 0 t e £ , while  ˆt e
- equals  ˆt e  or zero when  ˆ 0 t e <  or  ˆ 0 t e ³ . Similarly, short-run 
asymmetry is captured by decomposing the first differences into  0 1 > - = D - - -
+
- i jt i jt i jt x x x  and 
0 1 < - = D - - -
-
- i jt i jt i jt x x x , where  m j ,.., 1 =  and  p i ,.., 0 = . 
Simple  inspection  of  the  sign,  magnitude  and  statistical  significance  of  the  estimated 
coefficients offers a first insight on the presence of asymmetric price behaviour. However, in 
order  to  establish  if  the  estimated  coefficients  of  model  (3)  are  statistically  different,  the 
(single or joint) hypotheses H0: 
- + =a a , 
- + = i i l l , 
- + = i i g g , .., 
- + = i i d d  have to be formally 
tested.  The  asymmetric  ECM  has  often  been  used  as  an  appropriate  framework  for 
conventional  F  tests  of  both  the  hypothesis  of  symmetric  adjustment  to  the  long-run 
equilibrium and the hypothesis of short-run symmetry. A few recent studies (see Cook et al., 
1998, 1999, and Cook, 1999) have shown that standard tests of symmetry are affected by low 
power in an ECM framework. The solution adopted in this paper is to boostrap the calculated 
F statistic and obtain the corresponding rejection frequencies via simulation (see also Galeotti 
et al., 2003). 
 
3.2 Threshold autoregressive ECM 
 
A  popular  generalization  of  equation  (3)  adds  a  threshold  autoregressive  (TAR) 
mechanism  to  the  standard  ECM.  The  resulting  model  is  referred  to  as  the  TAR-ECM 
specification. While it is set to zero in the classical asymmetric ECM, the threshold parameter 
is consistently estimated using the TAR-ECM.  
 
A two-regime TAR-ECM has the form: 
   11 
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1 1 1 2
1 0 0
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t i t i i t i i mt i t t
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x x x x
x x x q e
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- - - -
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 




  (4) 
 
where  p indicates the autoregressive order,  t q  is the threshold variable, which is a continuous 
and stationary transformation of the data, and g ÎG is the threshold parameter.
4 The region 
denoted by  G is typically selected by sorting the observations on the threshold variable into 
an increasing order and by trimming the bottom and top 15% quantiles; the resulting model is 
well identified for all possible thresholds. The error term  t e  is assumed to be a martingale 
difference sequence. The function  () . 1  indicates whether or not the threshold variable is above 
the  threshold.  The  regression  coefficients  are  ( ) i i i d g l a ,.., , ,   if  g £ t q ,  and 
( )
* * * * ,.., , , i i i i i i d d g g l l a a + + + +   if  g > t q .  Alternatively,  if  we  define ( )
'
1 .. p mt t t x Y - - D = e , 
( ) ( )
' ' ' 1 ) ( g g > = t t t t q Y Y Y ,  = 1 q ( )
' ,.., p d a ,  = 2 q ( )
' * *,.., p d a  and q =( )
' ' '
2 1 q q , model (4) can be 
expressed as: 
 
( ) t t t e Y x + = D q g
'
1   (5) 
 
Since  equation  (5)  is  non-linear  and  discontinuous,  the  parameter  estimates  can  be 
obtained  by  sequential  conditional  least  squares.  The  procedure  is  as  follows:  for  each 
possible value of the threshold (i.e. for each  G Î g ), a regression of the form (5) is estimated 
with least squares; for each regression, the sum of squared residuals,  ( ) g S , is calculated; the 
threshold’s estimate,  gˆ, is the argument that minimizes  ( ) g S ; the slope estimates are the 
coefficients  ( ) g q ˆ  of the corresponding equation (see Hansen, 2000). 
   
It is crucial to test the significance of the threshold autoregressive model (5) relative to the 
linear model (2). The null hypothesis in this case is 
* * * *
0 : .. 0 i i i H a l g d = = = = =  for each i. 
Defining  the  selector  matrix  ( ) I = 0 R ,  ( ) ( ) ( )
' g g g t t Y Y M ∑ =   and  ( ) ( ) ( )
2 ' ˆt t t e Y Y V g g g ∑ = , 
                                                 
4 Since the original series are non-stationary, plausible thresholds are the exogenous variables in first differences 
or the error correction term.    12 
where  I  is  the  identity  matrix  of  appropriate  dimension,  we  can  write  the  pointwise 
heteroskedasticity-consistent Wald statistic as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) g q g g g g q g ˆ ˆ
1 ' 1 1 '
R R M V M R R W
- - - =   (6) 
 






= sup   (7) 
 
The distribution of W in expression (7) is non-standard, as the threshold is not identified 
under the null hypothesis of linearity. This problem has been analyzed in different contexts by 
Andrews  and  Ploberger  (1994)  and  Hansen  (1996),  among  others.  In  particular,  Hansen 
(1996) suggests a bootstrapping procedure to approximate the asymptotic distribution of (7). 
This  procedure  can  be  implemented  as  follows:  i)  draw  a  sample  of  random  numbers 
t h ~ ( ) 0,1 NID  and define  t t t e x h ˆ
* = ; ii) regress 
*
t x  on  t Y  to obtain the restricted sum of squared 
residuals 
* ~
S ; iii) regress 
*
t x  on  ( ) g t Y  to obtain the unrestricted sum of squared residuals 
( ) g
* S ; iv) compute  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) g g g
* * * * ~
S S S T W - = , where T  is the number of observations and 
( ) g
g
* * supW W
G Î
= .  Repeat  steps  i)-iv)  B  times,  and  denote  with 
*
b W   the  calculated  statistic 
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A second relevant issue concerns the significance of the threshold estimate. Consider the 
null  hypothesis  g g = 0 0 : H ,  where  0 g   is  the  true  value  and  g   is  a  specified  value.  A 
likelihood ratio-type statistic is:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) g g g g ˆ ˆ S S S T LR - = .   
 
This statistic has a non-standard distribution. In case of homoskedasticity, it is possible to 
show that:   13 
 
( ) x g ¾® ¾d LR 0    
where 
( ) ( ) s s W
R s - =























) ( 1 n - W and  ) ( 2 n W being  two  independent  standard  Brownian  motions  on  [ ) ¥ , 0 .  Critical 
values of x  are reported in Hansen (1997). If the error term is heteroskedastic, the asymptotic 
distribution depends on a new nuisance parameter, which Hansen (1997) suggests to treat 
with non-parametric techniques.  
 
3.3 ECM with threshold cointegration 
 
Both  asymmetric  ECM  and  TAR-ECM  are  based  on  the  Engle-Granger  two-step 
approach, that is testing for the presence of cointegration among the relevant price series is 
implemented via an ADF test on the long-run residuals. However, if the adjustment to the 
long-run equilibrium is asymmetric, that is, if it depends on the sign of the shocks, the test for 
cointegration  is  misspecified  (see  Balke  and  Fomby,  1997).    In  order  to  overcome  this 
problem, Enders and Granger (1998) replace the standard ADF auxiliary regression with the 
following TAR process: 
 
( ) 1 1 2 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 t t t t t t e r e r e n - - D = I + -I +   (8) 
 
where  ˆt e  are the residuals of the long-run equation (1). 
The indicator function  t I  is defined to depend on the lagged values of the residuals, 




ˆ 1   0











I =  £ 
  (9) 
 
or on the lagged changes in  ˆt e : 
   14 
1
1
ˆ 1   0











I =  D £ 
  (10) 
 
Equations (8)-(9) are referred to as TAR cointegration, while model (8)-(10) is named 
“momentum”  TAR  (or  M-TAR)  cointegration.  The  TAR  model  is  designed  to  capture 
potential asymmetric “deep” movements in the residuals, while the M-TAR model is useful to 
take  into  account  sharp  or  “steep”  variations  in  ˆt e   (see  Enders  and  Granger,  1998).  As 
demonstrated  by  Sichel  (1993),  negative  “deepness”  (i.e.  2 1 r r < )  of  ˆt e   implies  that 
increases tend to persist, whereas decreases tend to revert quickly towards equilibrium. Since 
there is generally no presumption on whether to use TAR or M-TAR specifications, it is 
recommended  to  choose  the  appropriate  adjustment  mechanism  via  a  model  selection 
criterion, such as the Akaike information criterion (AIC). 
 
The test for the presence of a threshold in the equilibrium correction mechanism is termed 
threshold cointegration test. If  2 1 r r =  the adjustment is symmetric, thus the Engle-Granger 
approach turns out to be a special case of equations (8) and (9). If the errors are serially 





1 1 2 1
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1
p
t t t t t i t i t
i




D = I + -I + D + ∑   (11) 
 
The threshold parameter does not need to be restricted to zero, as instead it is in models 
(9)  and  (10).  If  the  threshold  enters  the  model  unrestrictedly,  the  problem  of  how  to 
consistently estimate the threshold, or attractor, emerges. Tong (1983) shows that the sample 
mean  of  the  cointegrating  residuals  is  a  biased  estimator  of  the  attractor.  Chan  (1993) 
demonstrates  that  a  search  procedure  over  all  possible  values  of  the  attractor  in  order  to 
minimize the sum of squared residuals yields a super-consistent estimator of the threshold. If, 
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I =  D £ 
  (12) 
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where m ˆ  indicates the consistent estimate of the threshold. 
 Once equation (11) is estimated, the null hypothesis  0 1 2 : 0 H r r = =  of no cointegration 
can be tested through a F test. Correct critical values depend on the number of observations, 
the  number  of  lags  in  equation  (11)  and  the  number  of  variables  in  the  cointegrating 
relationship  (see  Enders,  2001).  The  empirical  distribution  of  the  F  test  under  the  null 
hypothesis  is  tabulated  for  up  to  five  variables,  different  sample  sizes  and  order  of  the 
augmentation in Wane et al. (2004). If the null hypothesis is rejected (i.e. the series  ˆt e  follows 
a  TAR  or  a  M-TAR  model),  1 ˆ r   and  2 ˆ r   converge  to  a  multivariate  normal  distribution. 
Therefore, the hypothesis of symmetric adjustment, i.e. 2 1 r r = , can be tested using a standard 
F distribution. The corresponding asymmetric error correction representation can be written 
as: 
 





t up t down t i t i i mt i i t i t
i i i
x x x x a e a e g d l x - - - - -
= = =
D = + + D + + D + D + ∑ ∑ ∑   (13) 
  
where  1 1 ˆ ˆ
up
t t t e e - - = I  and  ( ) 1 1 ˆ ˆ 1
down
t t t e e - - = -I . 
 
4.  Empirical results and discussion 
 
We estimate the asymmetric error correction models described in Section 3 to describe the 
gasoline-price relation in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK over the period 1985-2003. 
 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the movements of gasoline-oil price relation 
over  time,  we  analyze  the  transmission  of  changes  in  the  crude  oil  price  directly  to  the 
gasoline price at the pump (single stage), as well as the relations crude spot price-gasoline 
spot price (first stage) and gasoline spot price-retail gasoline price (second stage). Therefore, 
three equations are estimated for each model and country.  
 
Tables 1-5 refer to the asymmetric ECM. The estimated coefficients and corresponding t-
statistics are reported in Tables 1-3, whereas Tables 4-5 present the results of testing for price 
asymmetries. Coefficients 
+ a  and 
- a  in Table 1 indicate  asymmetric adjustment speeds, 
which measure long-run asymmetry, while the coefficients 
+
i g  and 
-
i g , i=1,…,p, account for   16 
short-run,  or  transitory,  asymmetry.  The  results  suggest  that  “positive”  coefficients  are 
generally larger, in absolute value, than their “negative” counterparts for both long-run and 
short-run, as well as in each stage. This finding is unexpected for long-run effects, where 
“positive”  (
+ a )  and  “negative”  (
- a )  coefficients  are  associated  with  adjustments  to  the 
equilibrium level from above and from below. In contrast, short-run estimates, which show 
that after two periods the effects of upstream price increases are larger than those of price 
decreases  for  all  countries,  reflect  more  closely  the  consumers’  perception  of    the  actual 
effects of oil price variations on gasoline price changes.   
 
If we concentrate on the two-stage analysis, some additional remarks emerge. First, the 
magnitude of coefficients is larger in the first stage than in the second stage. Second, lagged 
effects compensate for the large impact of contemporaneous oil price changes in the refinery 
stage, while the adjustment towards the equilibrium level is more gradual in the distribution 
stage. These findings reflect the differences between the refinery and distribution markets. 
The quotations of spot gasoline react immediately to the fluctuations in the price of oil. In 
contrast,  retailers  do  not  immediately  transfer  onto  pump  prices  all  the  adjustments  in 
wholesale prices (and thus in crude oil prices); rather, changes are distributed over time. 
 
A cross-country comparison reveals significant differences, especially at the second stage. 
The adjustment to the long-run equilibrium appears to be larger from below than from above  
in the Italian and Spanish distribution markets. In contrast, the systematically larger impact of 
price increases over price reductions tends to compensate the insignificant adjustment from 
below to the steady-state level in the retail chain of France and U.K.. Surprisingly, gasoline 
prices  in  Germany  seem  to  react  more  to  price  decreases  and  to  positive  gaps  to  the 
equilibrium, than to price increases and negative disequilibrium. 
 
Table 2 considers the transmission of shocks in exchange rates to retail prices. In the first 
stage, only positive changes appear to be significant, with the only exception of Germany. 
This evidence suggests that producers are generally reluctant to transfer onto consumers those 
price reductions which originate from favourable movements in exchange rates. Interestingly, 
this evidence disappears in the single stage, and it is supportive of the idea of separately 
modelling production and distribution stages.  
   17 
The estimated autoregressive coefficients, which enter the model when the lag-length is 
equal to, or larger than, one, are reported in Table 3. All the estimated coefficients have 
positive signs in the first stage and are generally negative in the second. Moreover, relevant 
differences between “positive” and “negative” coefficients, as well as among countries, arise 
in  the  second  stage.  In  particular,  the  coefficients  relative  to  positive  lagged  changes  in 
gasoline prices are significant and negative for France and Italy, while negative changes are 
significant and exhibit positive coefficients in the case of U.K. Spain does not show relevant 
autoregressive asymmetries.   
 
In order to verify whether the differences between the adjustment coefficients and short-
run effects are significant, formal statistical testing is required. Table 4 reports the calculated 
conventional F test for the hypothesis of long-run and short-run asymmetries. Rejection of the 
null  hypothesis  H0: 
- + =a a   implies  asymmetric  long-run  adjustment,  whereas  short-run 
asymmetries arise when at least one of the hypotheses H0: 
- + = i i g g , 
- + = i i d d  or 
- + = i i l l , 
1 , 0 = i , is rejected.
5 Table 4 shows that long-run asymmetries occur in 3 cases out of 15, 
while in 8 cases out of 51 short-run asymmetries are significant. If we compare different 
countries and stages, long-run asymmetries characterize only France and Italy (single stage), 
and Germany (second stage). The lagged price effects are asymmetric at the first stage in 
France  and  Germany,  and  at  the  second  stage  in  France,  Spain  and  U.K..  Moreover,  the 
reaction  to  exchange  rate  variations  is  asymmetric  in  U.K.  at  the  first  stage.  Finally, 
contemporaneous price asymmetries arise in France and U.K. at the single stage. Overall, the 
test suggests the presence of asymmetry in 11 cases, a number which is much smaller than 
expected, both in terms of how this phenomenon is perceived by the ordinary consumer and 
from a visual inspection of the estimated coefficients. However, due to the well documented 
lack  of  power  of  the  F  test  in  the  context  of  asymmetric  ECM,  any  straightforward 
interpretation of the results reported in Table 4 may be misleading. Following, among others, 
Galeotti et al. (2003), we believe that a more reliable picture of potential asymmetries in the 
oil-gasoline price relation can emerge by bootstrapping the F statistics. Table 5 presents the 
calculated rejection frequencies at 5% significance level based on 1000 replications. As in 
Cook et al. (1999), we look at the number of rejection frequencies which are larger than 15% 
and 58% (“high” rejection frequencies): these amount to 32 and 8 out of 64.
 In contrast with 
                                                 
5 In order to economize space, F tests for symmetric short-run effects are reported for contemporaneous and one 
period lagged changes only.   18 
the standard F tests, the simulated results suggest that each country is more likely to present 
asymmetries, particularly at the second and single stages. 
 
To  summarise,  when  using  the  asymmetric  ECM  approach  to  describe  the  price 
transmission  mechanism  in  the  gasoline  markets  of  five  European  countries,  we  do  find 
evidence to support the presence of asymmetric price behaviour almost in all countries, and 
mainly at the distribution stage. As pointed out by Borenstein et al. (1997), retail sales, in 
contrast with other segments of the oil market, are likely to be characterized by oligopolistic 
cooperation. Therefore, our results, which evidence that asymmetry is stronger in the second 
stage, can be explained in terms of reduced competition among retailers. 
  
The two-regime TAR-ECM differs from the asymmetric ECM in two respects: it treats the 
threshold as an estimable parameter, rather than restricting it to zero, and it accounts only for 
short-run  asymmetries.  Tables  6-8  report  the  estimated  value  and  significance  of  the 
coefficients  of  the  TAR-ECM  specification.  Table  9  presents  the  estimated  values  of  the 
threshold parameter, in addition to the calculated Wald statistic for the null hypothesis of no 
threshold effect and the corresponding approximated p-values. Figures 1-4 plot the adjusted 
likelihood ratio and the Wald statistics for France (single stage) and Italy (first stage).  
 
An informal indicator of the presence of asymmetries in the oil-gasoline price relation is 
given by the number of times the estimated coefficients of the error correction term and of the 
short-run variations differ depending on the sign of short-run price changes, i.e. whether the 
threshold variable is above or below a specific estimated value. If we consider equation (4), 
the long-run adjustment is measured by a  if the threshold variable is below the estimated 
threshold, while it is 
* a a +  otherwise. Similarly, short-run coefficients are  ( ) i i i d g l ,.., ,  and 
( )
* * * ,.., , i i i i i i d d g g l l + + + .  Therefore,  significant  “differential”  parameters 
* * * , , i i d g a and 
*
i l  
suggest the presence of price asymmetries. 
  
   Looking at the empirical results presented in Tables 6-8, the coefficients accounting for 
both long-run and short-run price asymmetries which are statistically significant at 5% are 24 
out of 71. If we concentrate on Table 6, significant long-run asymmetries (i.e. 
* a ) arise in 4 
cases out of 15, whereas short-run asymmetries (i.e. 
*
i g ,  2 , 1 , 0 = i ) are found in 10 cases out of 
28.    19 
 
If we compare the estimated asymmetric coefficients across stages, the main differences 
are  related  to  the  sign  of  the  coefficients  1 g   and  to  the  optimal  number  of  lags  in  each 
equation. The lagged short-run effects are negative and contribute to the reduction of the 
impact of contemporaneous changes in the first stage, while they are positive and tend to 
increase the cumulative effect of oil and wholesale price changes on gasoline prices in the 
second and single stage. Moreover, the short-run impact of spot price changes vanishes in one 
or  two  periods  for  the  first  and  single  stages,  while  it  is  generally  distributed  over  three 
periods in the second stage. These findings are very close to the results obtained with the 
asymmetric ECM. Furthermore, it is worthwhile noticing that significant differences in long-
run adjustments arise mainly in the second and single stages, while “differential” short-run 
effects characterize all stages and have positive sign, except for France in the second stage. 
 
Table 7 reports the estimates of the exchange rate effects. All contemporaneous impacts 
(i.e.  0 d )  are  significant  and  positive,  while  lagged  differential  effects  are  positive  and 
statistically significant in the first stage only. Coefficients 
*
0 d  and  0 d  have opposite signs in 
all countries and stages, again except for France in the single stage.  
 
The autoregressive coefficients  1 l  reported in Table 8 are significant and positive in the 
first stage, whereas they are negative and significant in the second stage. In a few cases, 
autoregressive effects are different depending on the magnitude of contemporaneous changes 
in oil prices. Spain (second stage) excluded, significant coefficients 
*
1 l  and  1 l  have opposite 
signs.  
 
The estimated parameter values depend on the estimated values of the threshold. The latter 
are  calculated  using  a  likelihood  ratio  approach,  after  adjusting  the  LR  statistic  for 
heteroskedasticity in the residuals.
6 As an illustration, Figures 1 and 3 present the plots of the 
adjusted LR against the estimated values of the threshold for France in the single stage and 
Italy in the first stage, respectively. Values of the threshold corresponding to a LR below the 
dotted line are not rejected by the data. It is worth observing that the interval of threshold 
values below the dotted line in Figure 1 is rather tight, while the threshold estimates seem to 
be less precise in Figure 3. As far as the other countries are concerned, LR plots are well-
                                                 
6 This adjustment has been obtained by calculating the LR sequence on the GLS residuals.   20 
shaped (i.e. similar to Figure 1) in about 50% of the cases. The estimates of the threshold are 
reported in Table 9. Significant and positive threshold values are found in 4 countries, namely 
France and Germany in the first stage, Italy in the second stage and U.K. in the single stage.  
 
In  order  to  test  the  null  hypothesis  of  linearity  against  the  threshold  model  we  use  a 
heteroskedasticity-consistent Wald statistic. Figures 2 and 4 display the plots of the statistic 
against the threshold for France (single stage) and Italy  (first  stage). The calculated  test, 
along  with  approximated  p-values  for  each  country  and  stage,  are  reported  in  Table  9.  
Rejection of the null hypothesis of symmetry at 5% significance level occurs for France in the 
refinery stage, for Germany and Italy in the distribution stage, and for France and Germany in 
the single stage. In addition, if we test for symmetry at 1% significance level, evidence of 
asymmetric pricing behaviour is found also for Italy and Spain in the first stage and for 
France in the second stage.  
 
The overall picture which emerges from the estimation of the threshold ECM is that price 
asymmetries are present in 34% of the cases. Moreover, asymmetries are more likely a short-
run phenomenon (35.7%) than a long-run feature of the oil-gasoline price relation (26.7%). If 
we compare these findings with the results from the asymmetric ECM (according to which 
asymmetric price behaviour characterizes only 16% of the cases, with 13.3% of long-run and 
16.3%  of  short-run  asymmetries),  the  TAR-ECM  approach  turns  out  to  provide  stronger 
support to non-linear pricing schemes in the oil market.  
 
 
As illustrated in Section 4, a threshold specification of the error correction mechanism is 
needed  to  test  for  threshold  cointegration.  Tables  10-15  report  the  results  obtained  by 
estimating and testing the threshold cointegrating relationship. Estimates and test statistics are 
relative to the three possible formulations of the error correction terms, namely TAR, M-TAR 
and  consistent  M-TAR  (MC-TAR  hereafter),  and  are  presented  in  Tables  10-12.  The 
estimated coefficients of the asymmetric ECM with threshold cointegration are reported in 
Tables 13-15. 
 
Tables 10-12 show that the M-TAR specification is generally superior to the basic TAR 
model, at least according to AIC. The sequential conditional OLS method is then used to 
consistently estimate the threshold parameter for the M-TAR model. Within the MC-TAR   21 
specification, the threshold cointegration tests reject the null hypothesis H0: 0 2 1 = = r r  in 
favour  of  asymmetric  cointegration  for  each  country  and  stage.  Moreover,  all  p-values 
associated with the tests for the null hypothesis of symmetry are smaller than 5%, supporting 
the idea of asymmetric adjustments. The reported evidence of asymmetric cointegration leads 
to the estimation of the ECM with long-run asymmetric equilibrium. Long-run adjustments 
are allowed to differ depending on the previous period changes in the long-run error terms. 
The estimated long-run coefficients are presented in Table 12. The most relevant asymmetric 
effects  appear  in  the  single  stage.  The  coefficients  down a   are  all  strongly  significant  and 
generally larger, in absolute value, than the corresponding  up a , which are not even significant 
for Italy, Spain and U.K. (see Table 13). As for the first stage, all coefficients are significant 
and, in the case of Italy and Spain, the estimated adjustments from below to the equilibrium 
exceed the corresponding adjustments from above by more than 0.1. The differences between 
the estimated coefficients are smaller in the second stage. It is important to point out that, 
contrary to the asymmetric ECM, the ECM with threshold cointegration identifies long-run 
asymmetries of the expected sign, that is adjustments from below are found to be faster than 
adjustments  from  above.
7  This  suggests  that  a  threshold  specification  of  the  long-run 
mechanism provides a more plausible representation of the oil-gasoline price relationship. 
 
If  we  compare  the  empirical  findings  across  stages,  the  magnitude  of  the  adjustment 
coefficients is larger for the first stage than for the second and single stages. Moreover, as in 
the cases of asymmetric ECM and threshold ECM, coefficients  0 g  ( 1 g ) are significant and 
positive (negative) in the first stage, while contemporaneous price effects are smaller and 
lagged price effects positive in the other stages. Finally, the temporal delay of the reaction of 
downstream prices to upstream price changes is larger in the distribution stage than at the 
refinery level.   
  
Table 14 reports the estimated effects of exchange rate movements on prices. As expected, 
all coefficients are positive. The effects die out after one period in the first stage, while in two 
cases lagged effects are significant at the single stage. This behaviour is due to the larger time 
delay  in  the  reaction  of  pump  prices  to  cost  (and  therefore  exchange  rate)  variations. 
Autoregressive parameters are presented in Table 15. In line with the results obtained by 
                                                 
7 A comparison with the TAR-ECM, where the threshold variable is the short-run variation of upstream prices, is 
less informative, thus it is not presented.    22 
estimating  the  asymmetric  ECM  and  threshold  ECM,  the  autoregressive  coefficients  are 
positive in the distribution stage, while, in general, negative in the second stage. 
 
The results of the estimation of the threshold cointegration ECM show strong evidence of 
asymmetries  in  the  transmission  of  oil  price  changes  to  retail  prices  (single  stage). 
Adjustments  toward  the  equilibrium  between  crude  oil  prices,  gasoline  retail  prices  and 
exchange rates are faster when changes in the deviation from equilibrium are smaller than the 




Contrasting evidence about price asymmetries in the oil-product price relationship has 
been  found  in  the  applied  econometric  literature.  Different  data,  together  with  different 
econometric models, have been employed in different studies. One of the major causes of the 
very  large  volatility  in  the  empirical  findings  is  the  heterogeneity  of  the  econometric 
approaches used in the empirical applications. Thus, a thorough assessment of the impact of 
different econometric approaches on the results cannot be put off any longer. 
  
In this paper the three most popular econometric models for price asymmetries are applied 
to  the  same  dataset,  namely  asymmetric  ECM,  threshold  ECM,  and  ECM  with  threshold 
cointegration. These models account for different aspects of the potentially asymmetric oil-
product price relationship. The asymmetric ECM includes long- and short-run asymmetries, 
but it forces the threshold to be zero. The threshold ECM tests the existence of short-run 
asymmetric price behaviour, and it allows to consistently estimate the unknown threshold 
value. The ECM with threshold cointegration assumes that adjustments toward the long-run 
equilibrium  differ  depending  on  whether  changes  in  the  deviation  from  equilibrium  are 
positive or negative. The dataset we use in the empirical application includes crude oil, spot 
and retail gasoline prices, together with exchange rates for France, Germany, Italy, Spain and 
U.K. over the period 1985-2003. 
 
A detailed comparison of the results obtained by estimating each model highlights both 
similarities and differences. All models are able to find the temporal delay in the reaction of 
retail prices to changes in spot gasoline and crude oil prices, as well as some evidence of 
asymmetric behaviour. However, the type of stages and the number of countries which are   23 
characterized by asymmetric oil-gasoline price relations vary across models. The asymmetric 
ECM supports some evidence of asymmetry for all countries, mainly at the distribution stage. 
The  threshold  ECM  strongly  rejects  the  null  hypothesis  of  symmetric  pricing  behaviour, 
particularly in the case of France (all stages) and Germany (distribution level). Finally, the 
ECM  with  threshold  cointegration  captures  long-run  asymmetry  for  each  country  in  the 
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Table 1. Asymmetric ECM - asymmetric adjustment speeds and short-run price asymmetries 
 
  France  Germany  Italy  Spain  U.K. 
 
  first stage: spot=f(crude, exchange rate) 
LR asymm. 
























































(-1.868)  - 
SR asymm.
-







(-4.179)  - 
 
  second stage: retail=f(spot) 
LR asymm. 

















































1 g   0.545 








1 g   0.329 








2 g   0.271 
(3.524)  -  0.177 
(3.173) 
0.096 
(1.742)  - 
SR asymm.
-
2 g   0.161 
(2.298)  -  0.176 
(3.375) 
0.174 
(2.925)  - 
SR asymm.
+
3 g   -  -  0.032 
(0.612) 
0.111 
(2.093)  - 
SR asymm.
-
3 g   -  -  0.189 
(3.716) 
0.080 
(1.405)  - 
 
  single stage: retail=f(crude, exchange rate) 
LR asymm. 

















































1 g   0.244 






1 g   0.261 




Notes: LR = long-run; SR = short-run; parameters 
+ a , 
- a ,  +
i g and  -
i g refer to equation (3),  where m=3 and x1=SP, x2=CR, x3=ER for the 
first stage; m=2, x1=NR and x2=SP for the second stage; m=3, x1=NR, x2=CR and x3=ER for the single stage. For each parameter the 
estimated value and t-ratio (in brackets) are reported. The optimal number of  lags in the asymmetric ECM is chosen to eliminate any 
residual autocorrelation. A  “-“  in correspondence to the i-th lag (i=1,2,3) indicates that the optimal number of lags is i-1.   25 
Table 2. Asymmetric ECM - exchange rate asymmetries 
 
  France  Germany  Italy  Spain  U.K. 
 
  first stage: spot=f(crude, exchange rate) 
SR asymm.
+























  single stage: retail=f(crude, exchange rate) 
SR asymm.
+
























1 d   0.254 






1 d   -0.086 




Notes: LR = long-run; SR = short-run; parameters  +
i d and  -
i d refer to equation (3), where m=3, x1=SP, x2=CR and x3=ER for the first stage; 
m=2, x1=NR and x2=SP for the second stage; m=3, x1=NR, x2=CR and x3=ER for the single stage. For each parameter the estimated value 
and t-ratio (in brackets) are reported. A “-“  in correspondence to the i-th lag (i=1,2,3) indicates that the optimal number of lags is i-1. 
 
Table 3. Asymmetric ECM - autoregressive asymmetries 
 
  France  Germany  Italy  Spain  U.K. 
 
  first stage: spot=f(crude, exchange rate) 
SR asymm.
+







(2.108)  - 
SR asymm.
-







(2.731)  - 
 
  second stage: retail=f(spot) 
SR asymm.
+
1 l   -0.458 








1 l   -0.178 








2 l   -0.220 
(-2.710)  -  -0.294 
(-2.956) 
-0.164 
(-1.742)  - 
SR asymm.
-
2 l   0.167 
(2.217)  -  -0.118 
(-1.185) 
-0.027 
(-0.269)  - 
 
  single stage: retail=f(crude, exchange rate) 
SR asymm.
+
1 l   -0.025 




1 l   0.108 
(1.180)  -  -  -  0.263 
(2.635) 
Notes: LR = long-run; SR = short-run;  parameters  +
i l and  -
i l refer to equation (3), where m=3,  x1=SP, x2=CR and x3=ER  for the first 
stage; m=2, x1=NR and x2=SP for the second stage; m=3, x1=NR, x2=CR and x3=ER for the single stage. For each parameter the estimated 
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France  Germany  Italy  Spain  U.K. 
 
  first stage: spot=f(crude, exchange rate) 



























(0.135)  - 

















(0.689)  - 
  second stage: retail=f(spot) 




















- + = 1 1 g g   4.937 






- + = 1 1 l l   3.803 






  single stage: retail=f(crude, exchange rate) 




















- + = 1 1 g g   0.015 














- + = 1 1 d d   0.562 




- + = 1 1 l l   0.772 
(0.380)  -  -  -  1.055 
(0.304) 
Notes: entries are the calculated F tests for the null hypothesis of symmetry, i.e. equality between the coefficients associated with error 
correction terms, price changes and exchange rate changes in equation (3), and the corresponding p-values (in brackets). Tests for symmetry 
are reported only for the long-run adjustments, contemporaneous and one period lagged changes. A “-“  in correspondence to the i-th lag 
(i=1,2,3) indicates that the optimal number of lags is i-1.   
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France  Germany  Italy  Spain  U.K. 
 
  first stage: spot=f(crude, exchange rate) 
- + =a a   0.133  0.117  0.094  0.065  0.054 
- + = 0 0 g g   0.092  0.052  0.042  0.228  0.090 
- + = 1 1 g g   0.709  0.688  0.503  0.321  - 
- + = 0 0 d d   0.273  0.170  0.400  0.340  0.864 
- + = 1 1 l l   0.085  0.085  0.056  0.065  - 
  second stage: retail=f(spot) 
- + =a a   0.165  0.669  0.461  0.480  0.299 
- + = 0 0 g g   0.142  0.065  0.141  0.256  0.236 
- + = 1 1 g g   0.627  -  0.059  0.641  0.577 
- + = 1 1 l l   0.505  -  0.311  0.117  0.459 
  single stage: retail=f(crude, exchange rate) 
- + =a a   0.412  0.107  0.734  0.081  0.045 
- + = 0 0 g g   0.926  0.061  0.05  0.130  0.557 
- + = 1 1 g g   0.067  -  -  0.101  0.055 
- + = 0 0 d d   0.055  0.28  0.368  0.045  0.331 
- + = 1 1 d d   0.116  -  -  0.105  0.234 
- + = 1 1 l l   0.145  -  -  -  0.165 
Notes:  entries  are  the  simulated  rejection  frequencies,  i.e.  the  percentage  number  of  rejections  (out  of  1,000  replications)  of  the  null 
hypothesis of symmetry using a F test at 5% significance level. A “-“  in correspondence to the i-th lag (i=1,2,3) indicates that the optimal 
number of lags is i-1.   28 
Table 6. TAR-ECM – two-regime adjustment speeds and short-run price effects  
 
  France  Germany  Italy  Spain  U.K. 
 
  first stage: spot=f(crude, exchange rate) 































SR “differential” eff 
*




















SR “differential”  effect 
*












  Second stage: retail=f(spot) 































SR “differential”  effect 
*










SR effect  1 g   0.645 






SR “differential” effect 
*
1 g  
-0.270 






SR effect  2 g   0.409 
(5.837)  -  0.123 
(3.626) 
0.096 
(2.361)  - 
SR “differential” effect 
*
2 g  
-0.340 
(-3.846)  -  -0.034 
(-0.277) 
0.121 
(1.592)  - 
 
  Single stage: retail=f(crude, exchange rate) 































SR “differential” effect 
*










SR effect  1 g   0.090 
(1.148)  -  -  -  - 
SR “differential”  effect 
*
1 g  
0.235 
(2.201)  -  -  -  - 
Notes: LR = long-run; SR = short-run; parameters a , 
* a , 
i g and  *
i g refer to equation (4), where m=3, x1=SP, x2=CR and x3=ER for the 
first stage; m=2, x1=NR and x2=SP for the second stage; m=3, x1=NR, x2=CR and x3=ER for the single stage. For each parameter the 
estimated value and t-ratio (in brackets) are reported. Reported t-ratios need to be compared with critical values of the normal distribution. A 
“-“  in correspondence to the i-th lag (i=1,2,3) indicates that the optimal number of lags is i-1. 
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Table 7. TAR-ECM – two-regime exchange rate effects 
 
  France  Germany  Italy  Spain  U.K. 
 
  first stage: spot=f(crude, exchange rate) 










SR “differential” effect 
*




















SR “differential” effect 
*












  single stage: retail=f(crude, exchange rate) 










SR “differential” effect 
*










SR effect  1 d   0.023 
(0.114)  -  -  -  - 
SR “differential” effect 
*
1 d  
0.104 
(0.380)  -  -  -  - 
Notes: LR = long-run; SR = short-run; parameters 
i d and  *
i d refer to equation (4), where m=3, x1=SP, x2=CR and x3=ER for the first stage; 
m=2, x1=NR and x2=SP for the second stage; m=3, x1=NR, x2=CR and x3=ER for the single stage. For each parameter the estimated value 
and t-ratio (in brackets) are reported. Reported t-ratios need to be compared with critical values of the normal distribution. A “-“  in 
correspondence to the i-th lag (i=1,2,3) indicates that the optimal number of lags is i-1. 
 
Table 8. TAR-ECM – two-regime autoregressive effects 
 
  France  Germany  Italy  Spain  U.K. 
 
  first stage: spot=f(crude, exchange rate) 










SR “differential” effect 
*












  second stage: retail=f(spot) 
SR effect  1 l   -0.815 






SR “differential” effect 
*
1 l  
0.751 






SR effect  2 l   -  -  -0.076 
(-1.818)  -  - 
SR “differential” effect 
*
2 l   -  -  0.209 
(2.372)  -  - 
 
  single stage: retail=f(crude, exchange rate) 
SR effect  1 l   0.355 
(3.564)  -  -  -  0.302 
(4.815) 
SR “differential” effect 
*
1 l  
-0.535 
(-4.322)  -  -  -  0.110 
(0.826) 
Notes: LR = long-run; SR = short-run; parameters 
i l and  *
i l refer to equation (4), where m=3, x1=SP, x2=CR and x3=ER for the first stage; 
m=2, x1=NR and x2=SP for the second stage; m=3, x1=NR, x2=CR and x3=ER for the single stage.  For each parameter the estimated value 
and t-ratio (in brackets) are reported. Reported t-ratios need to be compared with critical values of the normal distribution. A “-“  in 
correspondence to the i-th lag (i=1,2,3) indicates that the optimal number of lags is i-1. 
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Table 9. TAR-ECM – estimated thresholds and computed Wald tests  
 
  France  Germany  Italy  Spain  U.K. 
 
  first stage: spot=f(crude, exchange rate) 
Threshold g   0.062*  0.073*  0.051  0.073  -0.050 
Wald test  30.521  18.909  23.450  24.615  10.787 
p-value  0.027  0.206  0.079  0.086  0.779 
 
  second stage: retail=f(spot) 
Threshold g   -0.039*  -0.009  0.071*  0.024  0.069 
Wald test  25.565  15.175  27.618  20.024  12.856 
p-value  0.069  0.041  0.023  0.119  0.287 
 
  single stage: retail=f(crude, exchange rate) 
Threshold g   0.002  0.071  -0.081  -0.085  0.051* 
Wald test  30.092  26.514  12.731  13.644  22.961 
p-value  0.040  0.005  0.213  0.169  0.041 
Notes: A”*” indicates statistical significance at 5%. The calculated Wald statistics are testing the null hypothesis of linear ECM against the 
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Table 13. ECM with threshold cointegration - asymmetric adjustment speeds and short-run price effects 
 
  France  Germany  Italy  Spain  U.K. 
 
  first stage: spot=f(crude, exchange rate) 









































  second stage: retail=f(spot) 








































SR effect 2 g   0.180 
(4.012)  -  0.151 
(4.092) 
0.108 
(3.176)  - 
SR effect 3 g   -  -  0.103 
(2.963) 
0.057 
(2.382)  - 
 
  single stage: retail=f(crude, exchange rate) 






























SR asymm.  1 g   0.309 




SR asymm.  2 g   -0.128 
(-2.711)  -  -  -  - 
Notes: parameters 
up a , 
down a  and 
i g refer to equation (13), where m=3, x1=SP, x2=CR and x3=ER for the first stage; m=2, x1=NR and 
x2=SP for the second stage; m=3, x1=NR, x2=CR and x3=ER for the single stage. For each parameter the estimated value and t-ratio (in 
brackets) are reported. A “-“  in correspondence to the i-th lag (i=1,2,3) indicates that the optimal number of lags is i-1. 
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Table 14. ECM with threshold cointegration – exchange rate effects 
 
  France  Germany  Italy  Spain  U.K. 
 
  first stage: spot=f(crude, exchange rate) 











  single stage: retail=f(crude, exchange rate) 















i d  refer to equation (13), where m=3, x1=SP, x2=CR and x3=ER for the first stage; m=2, x1=NR and x2=SP for the second 
stage; m=3, x1=NR, x2=CR and x3=ER for the single stage. For each parameter the estimated value and t-ratio (in brackets) are reported. A “-
“  in correspondence to the i-th lag (i=1,2,3) indicates that the optimal number of lags is i-1. 
 
Table 15. ECM with threshold cointegration – autoregressive effects 
 
  France  Germany  Italy  Spain  U.K. 
 
  first stage: spot=f(crude, exchange rate) 











  second stage: retail=f(spot) 










SR asymm. 2 l   -  -  -0.182 
(-2.696)  -  - 
 
  single stage: retail=f(crude, exchange rate) 
SR asymm. 1 l   -  -  -  -  0.184 
(3.105) 
Notes: parameters 
i l  are the corresponding coefficients in equation (13), where m=3 and x1=SP, x2=CR and x3=ER for the first stage; m=2, 
x1=NR and x2=SP for the second stage; m=3, x1=NR, x2=CR and x3=ER for the single stage. For each parameter the estimated value and t-
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